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Foreword 
We in the Population Program of IIASA are frequently asked what systems analysis 
signifies in relation to demography. How does a systems approach differ from specialized 
analysis in the field of population? This working paper attempts to answer that question. 
It says, in brief, that systems analysis brings in a wider range of variables, tries to find 
mechanisms by which population influences the economy, the polity, the environment, 
and how these in turn influence population. It seeks to reveal those negative feedback 
mechanisms by which stability is maintained, and positive feedbacks that build up uncon- 
trolled consequences. 
Different writers have necessarily different ways of representing systems analysis. 
The examplea that follow, provided by myself and my colleagues, will show something of 
the range of legitimate interpretations. 
Nathan Keyfitz 
Leader 
Population Program 
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After half a century of exhortation to be interdisciplinary we still find little interdis- 
ciplinary analysis in the literature. That applies to demography as to other fields. 
There are reasons for this. A discipline builds up exacting standards of quality by 
which individuals are judged. The competent interdisciplinarian-unless he has the rare 
ability to meet the standards of two disciplines-is looked on as an amateur, an outsider, 
not to be taken seriously. He is a foreigner in each disciplinary group, who cannot be 
placed; no one knows just how to talk to him. 
All this is to the good insofar as specialization is the condition for depth. No one 
can know everything; better to dig deep, to have a good knowledge even of a narrow field; 
to extend one's interests over a wide territory is usually to be shallow. Yet the trouble is 
that the world outside does not respect disciplinary boundaries. There are no purely bio- 
logical phenomena independent of the laws of physics, nor economic phenomena indepen- 
dent of the operation of politics. Some of the most conspicuous examples of policy advice 
not working have been due to disregard of the essentially interdisciplinary character of 
the outside world. 
The point will be applied to six fields of demographic analysis. 
Fertility 
In the usual family planning model poverty generates many children; let people be- 
come better off and they will have fewer children; with fewer children they can raise their 
standard of living further, a positive feedback, a beneficial circle that indeed justifies p 
pulation control programs, but does not make them seem very urgent. Yet under current 
conditions development has an environmental cost, one that depends on the number of 
persons in the developing territory; the very number of these may make development that 
would have the effect of controlling fertility impossible. Introducing the environment 
changes the logical circuits, introduces a new urgency, even shows that there is a narrow 
window in time in which development is possible. 
Migration 
Rural-urban migration-especially to capital cities-is accounted for by the justly 
approved Harris-Todaro model-there are indeed poor people in the city, but there are 
also very rich people; migration will occur as long as the expected value of future income 
in the city is greater than the expected value in the countryside. But in a competitive 
market such migration would lower incomes and end in equilibrium; it does not account 
for the continued indefinite increase of urban populations. That is explained by a positive 
feedback loop: city populations pressure governments for lower food prices, that bring 
more people into the city, that increase the political pressure, and exact further benefits, 
and m on indefinitely. 
A gin9 
The difficulties of social security are attributed by experts to the aging of popula- 
tions: with low fertility there are fewer workers in prospect, and with low mortality pew 
ple will draw longer. Correct of course; but if this were tl-.? whole story people would sim- 
ply work to an older age and thus offset the aging of the population. Unexplained is the 
younger age of retirement in advanced countries despite the fact that old people would 
have more years of leisure even if retirement age was constant. The problem is not aging 
but the drive to younger retirement, and that installs a direct conflict of interest between 
the working generation and their elders. 
Perverse eflecto 
An element that is mostly out of the view of the experts is the effect of social securi- 
ty itself on the aging of populations. Not needing children for support in one's old age 
takes away one of the main reasons for large families. People saving for their own old age 
contribute capital to  the community in their youth whose real production they can draw 
on when old; as they have become richer and so more able to provide for their own old age 
the State has removed the incentive for them to  do so. 
The assumption of a large part of health costs by the State has had the effect of rais- 
ing those coats above what they were in the free market that preceded. Charges have al- 
ways been what the patient could afford to pay; they still are that notwithstanding the 
State's contribution. More important, they convert old age from an honored condition to 
a burden: the working population pays for health (including medical research) only in ord- 
er to extend life and so impose on itself the further cost of longer pensions. 
The family 
A part of the cause of the lower fertility of the rich countries is the weakening of 
bonds within families; couples divorce for minor reasons, many couples do not even marry 
in the first place. Family experts have tried to explain why husbands leave their wives 
and wives their husbands. But it is also the case that priests leave their church, workers 
leave their jobs, students leave their studies, all more casually than ever before. The spe- 
cialized analysis of the family in its very nature is incapable of finding the more general 
cause of institutional fragmentation. 
Ecology 
The disciplines of economics and ecology pursuing their separate studies come up 
with projections for the future that are wholly incompatible with one another. Contem- 
porary economics curves (unlike those of up to 50 years ago) are exponential upwards; the 
only dispute is whether the exponential is to be a t  2 per cent or 5 per cent per year. E c e  
logical models tend to be level; the web of life that is in balance generates so much fish, so 
much wood; any exponential increase is strictly temporary. An economic-ecological 
model that will be generally accepted is yet to be presented; it will be very different from 
either of the two separate models. 
In these six illustrations the interdisciplinary approach can be contrasted with the 
disciplinary or expert approach: fertility, migration, aging, mortality, family , environ- 
ment. All of these show the contrast, though in different ways. I have to  simplify in ord- 
er to  make the point; some of the qualifications are spelled out below. 
FERTILITY 
Fertility policies in developed countries aim to raise birth rates; in LDCs to  lower 
them. And within each of these there are differences: family allowances encourage births 
in poor communities like Newfoundland; in rich onea like France or Italy they have much 
less effect. Where housing is scarce its allocation on the basis of the number of children is 
a strong incentive; where housing is plentiful it is no incentive. 
Again in those very poor LDCs where couplea want many children the provision of 
contraceptive equipment will serve little purpose; where there is already some interest it 
can help a good deal; where sophistication on birth control has been attained, again i t  
adds less. Thus there ia a certain intermediate phase of development in which population 
program are most useful. That is t o  say these programs are a t  their most useful on the 
shoulder of the development curve (Interval A below). 
degree of 
development 
In the most common model applying to  the intermediate phase of development 
marked A, lower fertility slows population growth, and that permits faster development, 
which in turn further lowers fertility. This beneficial circle continues until the community 
is beyond the need for birth control programs, say until births have come down about to  
the level to  replace deaths. It tells us that birth control is needed, but any time for start- 
ing it will serve, and any speed of application is aa good as any other. Birth control is 
indeed desirable on this model but not very urgent. 
slower 
population 
development LJ 
Such assertions are narrow, in that among other matters they neglect the ecological 
setting. What is going to happen to the forests of Thailand if population continues to in- 
crease and cutting goes on at the present per capita rate? Certainly flooding, and perhaps 
in the end desertification. And insofar as the forest products are exported, and so pay for 
the capital for industry, their disappearance has multiple consequences for employment. 
It is in such ways that population, environment and employment are interlinked. 
We aim at a demographic-economic model, but one in which population and the 
economy are seated within the ecology, a configuration that has been neglected in uni- 
disciplinary models. Like other disciplines, economics as well as demography are driven 
by the impulee to autonomy: no specialty wants to be dependent for its ideas on another. 
The autonomy and specialization bring great power in some respects, but weakness in 
others. For instance, without environmental limits the population could expand to 
infinity. 
Our antecedents in this should be the great political economists of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, working before the several disciplines became so spwislized. Contemporary 
economics fashion theory suited to deal with short term questions (what will the bank 
rate of interest be next month?) but the investigator of the long term questions of popula- 
tion cannot afford to neglect the natural setting of the economy, the ecological base in 
which it sits. 
Thus seen from the narrow viewpoint of the national accounts, getting oil out of the 
ground so that it may be burned on the highways is production; from a wider viewpoint 
it is destruction, or expressed more moderately, it comes at an unrecorded ecological cost. 
that is not recorded in social or private accounting systems. The using up of our patri- 
mony of crude oil deposits is not counted as a cost in any financial account. National ac- 
counts recognize the cost of cleaning up the oceans after an oil spill, and add disburse- 
ments for this into the national income, but they do not make any deduction for the dam- 
age that is being repaired, nor for the fish killed and other harm done by oil spills that 
cannot be cleaned up. 
The ecological costs of population growth are what put the urgency into policy. Po- 
pulation control is a condition of development, on the one hand, and on the other will be 
automatically attained once development takes place. The question is whether the natur- 
al baae of the LDCs will be so eroded by the weight of population and economic activity 
that it will prevent the development that would control population. 
This is represented by a figure in which the circuit on the left, relating population 
and development, interacts with the figure on the right representing the finite environ- 
ment. When population grows fast and development is slow a population control pro- 
gram acting on the left side of the above diagram is interfered with by the circuit on the 
right recognizing environmental deterioration. 
MIGRATION 
The standard theory of migration to  the city is in terms of the expected income over 
a period of years if the peasant stays in the countryside, and his expected income if he 
comes to  the city. Certainly there is much unemployment and underemployment in the 
city, but there is also the chance of a fortune, and the latter weighs heavily in the 
peasant's anticipation of the economic return to  migration. 
expected income 
peasantry 
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This economic theory of internal migration is certainly valid, but one may doubt 
that it is the whole explanation of a phenomenon as vast and as persistent as the rural ex- 
odus of the less developed countries. That movement is the largest of any time in history. 
Cities of the third world are overflowing. Mexico City, now approaching 20 million, is fol- 
lowed by Cairo, Calcutta, Jakarta, and many others. Governments strain to  provide 
low-priced food, adequate schools and streets for the newcomers, not to mention houses 
and clean water; they know the political pressure to provide these (along with suitable 
employment) that can be exerted by concentrated millions, and they fear above all the 
sanctions in the form of riots and strikes that such masses can exercise. As the United 
Nations (1989, p.) says of Jakarta 
Of far greater importance than explicit spatial policies have been such factors 
as highly subsidized public services, which have created a bias in favor of the 
larger urban centres; the importance of physical proximity to central govern- 
ment officials for obtaining licenses and permits. 
The availability of cheap foodstuffs alone would support movement to the city. As 
the result of the pressures exerted by city masses, governments pass legislation ensuring 
that grain is priced low. The peasants are forced to submit to below-market prices for 
their output, and even where there is no price fixing by government but instead subsidies 
for city markets, the subsidies may well be paid for by peasants through taxes or other in- 
direct device. 
Yet price is not the only consideration; supply is even more important. In hard 
times in the past depressed conditions pushed people out of the cities onto the land; now 
it is the opposite: the city is where food is to be found. The international trade in cereals 
means that the city no longer has to be supplied from its neighboring countryside. 
Foreign aid plus the sale of raw materials provides the needed foreign exchange. Govern- 
ments persuade their farmers to produce peanuts or other export crops, whose sale price it 
can collect and then only partly funnel back to the peasant. Food policies alone would in- 
itiate a circuit with positive feedback and expand the cities without limit. 
Note that it is population pressure, especially that in the cities, which inspires bad 
economic policies. 
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The diagram suggests the more extended model needed if we are to recognize in the 
theory the political influence that operates on the economy. 
What makes this a systems issue is the reciprocal action: on the one hand the pres- 
ence of masses of people close to the seat of government exercises pressure for various 
benefits; as these benefits are dispensed they make the city more attractive to other irnrni- 
grants. There is no feasible way of making life better for those already in the city without 
attracting more people from the countryside. Thus the political factor completes the 
positive feedback loop within which the economics operates, and is creating third world 
cities of unprecedented size. 
AGING 
Much of the study of aging is concerned with the rising social security costs that will 
be faced when the baby boom of the industrial countries etarte to retire early in the 21st 
century. These are contrasted with the relatively low costs of the present, when the baby 
boom ie of working age and contributing, and the people drawing are the relatively few 
who have survived from earlier higher mortality. 
Yet if the problem was merely one of aging it could readily be met by people work- 
ing a few years longer. Calculation for the United States shows that a gradual rise of the 
pensionable age from 65 to 70 over the years 1990 to 2025 would keep the ratio of pen- 
sioners to working virtually constant. 
+ 
Instead of such a rise we observe a steadily falling age of retirement, along with con- 
stant political pressure to increase the benefits, especially when a temporary surplus in 
the trust fund comes into sight. One fears that social cohesion may not be sufficient to 
hold the system together when the bills come in for the present generous legislation 
presently in force. Many young people now doubt whether the generation subsequent to 
them will agree to pay the high costs of their old age pensions. 
What changes in the payments and benefits will make it more stable, more immune 
to the destructive pulling and hauling that is now anticipated? The answer is to be 
sought in the greater participation of the old on the contribution side. Starting the state 
pension at an older age, contributions at higher rates for those who are closer to  retire- 
ment, subjecting the pension to income tax, encouraging private funded pensions, allow- 
ing young people to secure some benefits from the fund, are all in the direction of lessen- 
ing the potential opposition of contributions vs. beneficiaries. They diminish the amount 
of social cohesion needed for the system to operate. 
aging 
Yet nearly everyone, after contributing, goes on to draw, so are not the two groups 
really the same people? No, in effect they are not, for if there is any diecounting of the 
future the ones starting to contribute and those starting to draw will have very different 
perspectives. This is true even discounting at 3 per cent per year, and the difference in 
their stakes becomes gross at present commercial rates of interest. 
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Any measure that increases the overlap between contributors and beneficiaries is 
helpful, for as long as these are two distinct groups tenaion is inevitable between them. 
Especially favorable would be permitting younger people to draw benefit for a sabbatical 
year or two (perhaps devoted to training for a new occupation) for which they would pay 
by having their final pension start correspondingly later, or in some other way. 
A systems analysis alao raises the question whether social security tends to under- 
mine itself. In logic at least its effect could be to render both children and saving 
unnecessary for the individual family, and ao to lower the amount of both. Ia it possible 
that the lack of savings weakens the economy, and the lack of children makes for an older 
population, and the result of both of these is the uncertainty of social security now feared? 
The basic point is that a purely economic, let alone a purely actuarial, formulation 
does not get a t  the real problem of social security, which is that when one group pays and 
another group benefits (whatever the entitlement) then standard economics by itself p r e  
videa no answer--for instance to the question of what the nature and amount of social 
security ought to be. 
MORTALITY 
Demographers spend much effort in the analysis of mortality and in forecasting what 
future mortality will be. Many models exist, all within the discipline of demography, 
which is to  say that they use past demographic data to predict the demographic future. 
Economic, medical, behavioral, political, considerations are referred to only in passing, or 
omitted altogether. The construction of life tables from observations; making of model 
life tables that would show the course of mortality improvement followed up to  now by 
advanced countries and so constituting a means of forecasting for countries that are 
behind, parameterizing mortality curves, breakdowns by cause of death, finding correlates 
of mortality and incorporating them in hazard models, are what the literature consists of. 
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Yet ultimately the questions asked by demography cannot be answered within that 
discipline. Part of the answers lie in medical and social science. The current rapid rate of 
improvement of mortality in advanced countries is due to medical discoveries plus change 
of behavior-better eating (leas red meat and eggs), more exercise, less smoking, etc. 
These improved practices seem to start with the better educated parts of the population; 
how fast they will move to others is a question of cultural diffusion. Neither demogra- 
phers nor phyeicians can get at thia diffusion process within their respective diaciplines. 
A wider question applies to medical research and therapy, of which a large and in- 
creasing fraction ie paid for by the etate, i.e., by those of working age in their capacity as 
taxpayers, largely for the benefit of the old. Thus the young pay to extend the lives of the 
old, and as a result have to pay for more years of social aecurity for them. Hence the Lon- 
don Economist ("A Time for Dying", August, 1989) says enough is enough-it is pointless 
to prolong life further. The Economist speaks of the pain that disease brings to the old, 
and this justifies its conclusion that they ought simply to withdraw from the world. Evi- 
dently the writer has in mind a causal scheme such as that below. If the effect of putting 
state funds into health H is to require more of social security expenditure S then there 
is a bottomless pit. The grim choice presented by the Economist would never occur to 
anyone if people paid for their own medical service and saved for their own pensions. 
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We have evidently gone through a historic cycle that started with boundless good 
will in state provision for the comfort of the old through medical research and therapy as 
well as social security, at least partly at the expense of the State, and then when costs rise 
and the bills come due, the goodwill gives way to the thought of how inconvenient it 
would be if the old were to live much longer than they now do. We have so far only 
heard a whisper of this, but with further medical advances it could well come to be said 
much louder. The evolution of popular thought from goodwill to just letting those old 
folks die is a phenomenon that will take a number of disciplines- and some c o u r a g e t o  
analyze. 
FAMILY 
Specialists have written a t  length on the high contemporary divorce rates, that 
reflect centrifugal forces within the modern family, and its resultant fragility. People 
voluntarily living alone, separate from children, parents, ex-spouses, or other kin, are a 
new phenomenon. The ability of women to earn a living as men do makes them indepen- 
dent. One surprising result of a teat of the negative income tax, providing poor women as 
well as men with a base income, was to increase divorce; this feature was what caused 
abandonment of the negative income tax in the United States. 
Much trust is placed in marriage counseling to help keep families together, and 
indeed family policy has not gone much beyond this. Housing subsidies may have some 
effect, but no one knows how much. Not many ideas for strengthening the family come 
out of pure family study, whether by sociologists or economists. 
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What specialists fail to notice is that the weakening of the family is paralleled by a 
weakening in many other institutions. Not only do husbands leave their wives and wives 
their husbands, but priests leave their church, soldiers leave their units, workers leave 
their jobs, students leave their schools. It is all very well to seek special explanations of 
the splitting of families, but elaborate explanations specific to the family are under suspi- 
cion if other institutions are also splitting. A systems approach tries to find what it  is in 
modern culture that leasens social coherence, and stirnulatea the cult of the lone indivi- 
dual. 
A specific problem for the family is the taking over of many of its functions by the 
State, so that the family becomes a unit of affection without being a unit of activity-in 
production, defense, education, etc. Losing the material functions that have traditionally 
been interwoven with familial affection, the affection tends to  fall away. People like other 
people with whom they are engaged in important activities, the affection being in part an 
epiphenomenon of the activity. 
If this is true a revival of the family will depend on nothing less than its finding 
important activities for the members to carry on in common. Laws, subsidies, and mari- 
tal counselling cannot solve the central problem. 
The diagram below represents the problem. What the solution may be has not yet 
emerged. 
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POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 
The relation between population size, style of life, and institutions on the one aide, 
and stress on the environment, using up of materials, waate disposal, etc. on the other, 
could well be given more attention than that provided by individual disciplines. These 
latter treat population and environment separately, and come out with very different con- 
clusions. 
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Economists foresee steadily rising inputs and outputs, but without taking full 
account of the increasing exchanges with the environment implied by this (first panel 
below). Biologists have tended to see the natural world as independent of man (second 
panel), though they are quicker to sense the implications of current developments than 
the rest of us. In any case different disciplines foresee future developments that are 
wholly inconsistent with one another, symbolized by the very different curves below. 
Economy, 
Populat ion and 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l  
System 
y i e l d  
tirne-e 
t 
........................................................................................................................................ 
We need to reconcile such one-discipline models. 
Let us admit that with given technology and style of life the inputs and outputs 
demanded from the environment will be exactly proportional to population. In contrast 
with this linear relation, the stress on the environment as it provides those inputs and 
accepts thaee outputs is far from linear. At low population levels there is no stress; the 
Biologica l  o r  
Natural  
System 
man agency is part of the natural system in equilibrium; at  higher levels of population 
density a point comes where the natural system is seriously interfered with. Equilibria 
that have existed for thousands of years can be upset in a decade or two, and a major 
resource (say a forest or fishery) diminished or destroyed. 
Because of the nonlinear relation between population and stress the visible destruc- 
tion comes on suddenly. Population has been growing for a long time; why does the 
growth of just this last decade or two have such dramatic effects? The matter is especial- 
ly puzzling in that the rate of increase is actually going down; if'the planet could stand a 
growth rate of 2.0 per cent per year why can it not stand a growth rate of 1.8 per cent per 
year? We submit that the answer cannot be found in economics or sociology or earth sci- 
ence alone, but only in the interaction between the growth of population and human insti- 
tutions on the one side and the natural system on the other. 
The ocean fisheries are an example of this interaction between institutions and na- 
ture. In them the world fish market gears into the biology of fish reproduction. There is 
harmony between the two as long as the population and its demand for fish are satisfied 
with no more harvest than the sustainable production of the ecological system. Let that 
be exceeded, and productivity starts to be reduced by overfishing; then even without any 
further increase of population or demand, in relation to the smaller fishery the overfishing 
will by itself intensify. Further capitalization in the competition to  catch what fish are 
left is a rational economic response. If the price elasticity is greater than unity*, rising 
prices can bring new entrants into the fishery just in the phase of declining capacity of the 
biological sydem. And existing firms with their capital already invested would continue 
in the field after there were no further new entrants. The interaction between rising 
prices and declining supplies can be guaranteed to produce cumulative stress on the fish 
ecology, among other effects leading to the capture of immature fish. If the fishing is 
selective for commercially usable species these will be replaced in the waters by unusable 
species. 
After a certain phase in the decline in productivity it will no longer pay to  put out 
to  sea, and the vessels will rust in harbor. If we have been fortunate there will have been 
places for the commercial species to hide, so that recovery can slowly take place. Under 
competitive conditions a small amount of recovery would make it profitable for the ships 
to  put to  sea again, and so with eome oscillations the fishery would continue at a low level 
of productivity. Lf there was no sanctuary the fishery would be permanently destroyed. It 
'More exactly we have to compare the elasticity of profit as a function of production with the elasticity of 
production ac~ a function of effort. 
would also be destroyed even if there was a sanctuary if the noncommercial species got 
such a start that they prevented the recovery of the commercial ones. Extinction of a 
species is obviously irreversible, but some changes short of extinction can also be irreversi- 
ble. When the economist's projection and that of the ecologist are reconciled they come 
out like the following diagram. 
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The fisheries exemplify issues common to  forestry, soils, underground water supplies, 
fur bearing animals, etc; in all such cases realistic study requires analysis of the interac- 
tion between a social system and a biological system. 
No one wants t o  be against empirical study, and yet given this configuration experi- 
ence of the past can be dangerously misleading. Britain and America made their greatest 
economic progress when their populations were growing fastest. For the world as a whole 
if 2 per cent growth did no harm in the 19609, how can 1.8 per cent growth hurt today? 
To interpret empirical data requires an appropriate model. 
Because of the distinctly non-linear interaction between human and natural systems 
simple extrapolation of data from the past can give very wrong results. And such extra- 
polation is included in the common procedures of the individual social sciences. If we are 
really in a novel and difficult situation now, and past empirical data, however volumi- 
nous, will show the way out only when suitably interpreted in a multi-disciplinary per- 
spective. 
SYSTEMS DIAGRAMS 
Sergei Scherbov 
The phenomena described by N. Keyfitz can be illustrated with the help of causal- 
loop diagrams used in the system dynamics approach. 
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Causal-loop diagram of city growth, a positive loop. 
Such a diagram can be read in the following way: the item at the tail of the arrow 
causes a change in the item at the head of the arrow. The plus (+) sign near the arrow- 
head indicates that the item at the tail and the item at the head of the arrow change in 
the same direction. If the tail increases the head increases, if the tail decreases the head 
decreases. 
The minus (-) sign near the arrowhead indicates that the item at the tail and the 
item at the head of the arrow change in opposite directions. If the tail increases the head 
decreases, if the tail decreases the head increases. 
The plus (+) sign is placed in the center of the loop to underline that it is a positive 
causal loop, one in which behavioral changes are reinforced. One of the ways to identify 
the sign of the feedback loop is to see how many minus (-) signs there are around the loop. 
An odd number of (-) signs euggests that the loop is negative. An even (or zero) number 
of (-) signs around the loop suggests that the loop is positive. Negative loops tend to keep 
the system under control by counteracting change. But generalization about the behavior 
of negative and positive loops must be viewed with caution. Given only the causal-loop 
representation of a system sqructure, the analyst can judge only approximately how that 
system will behave over time. 
In our case according to the figure above we have a positive feedback loop and such a 
system may not have an equilibrium point. But cities cannot grow indefinitely. Other 
forces not shown in a simple loop would ultimately stop uncontrolled growth. This means 
that other feedbacks exist restricting the number of migrants to the city. 
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Extended causal loop diagram of city growth including a negative feedback loop. 
With the growth of the city, environmental conditions worsen to  the point where 
they reduce the attractiveness of the city and thus the number of migrants. To  describe 
this we could add another feedback loop to  the existing one. Thus, by adding a negative 
feedback loop our system can attain stability. 
Another outcome of unconstrained growth of the city may be a deteriorating com- 
munications network or an overburdened transportation system. Finally, some laws res- 
tricting the number of migrants to  large cities could be adopted by the government. 
In real life there are many different feedback loops that tend to move the system in 
different directions. The systems approach rather than a single-discipline approach aims 
to catch the most important relations and feedbacks that determine behavior using 
knowledge from different disciplines. 
THREE MODES OF INTERVENTION IN THE SYSTEM THAT 
KEEPS FERTILITY HIGH AND STATUS OF WOMEN LOW 
Wolfgang Lutr 
Studies on the factors associated with continued high fertility in many less developed 
countries of the world have shown the existence of a positive feedback loop that seems to 
work both on an individual and aggregate level: women who have their first birth at  a 
very young age and usually also have a large number of children in rather short intervals 
have almost no chance to  improve their educational status even if adequate educational 
services were available, because they are stuck with the children. Without more educa- 
tion, however, young women have little chance to improve their status in their own farni- 
ly and in society. Consequently they are not likely to resist the social pressure from their 
husbands, kin, and the traditional community to have more children with only short in- 
tervals. 
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If this vicious cycle were somehow broken, however, the system would work to the 
benefit of women's status and also bring down fertility. In this case better education is 
likely to both change the value system of the woman by moving the emphasis from "quan- 
tity" of children to "quality" of children and at the same time strengthen her status in 
society (e.g. to have a job) and within the family, where she is better prepared to resist 
pressure from her kin for early marriage and from her husband for continued childbearing. 
And, in turn, a delay of first birth and a smaller total number of children is a prerequisite 
for further improvements in education and consequently in her social status. 
What are the chances to intervene into this process and make the vicious circle a 
beneficial one? 
Intervention A: Traditionally, family planning programs tried to influence the fertil- 
ity rates directly. The expectation was that the availability of contraceptive measures 
would directly bring down the number of children by delaying first birth, lengthening 
birth intervals, and stopping fertility after a certain number of children. Many of these 
programs, however, turned out to be a complete failure because they did not consider the 
dynamics described above. Women did not use contraceptives because in their value sys- 
tem they either did not want to delay first birth and limit the number of children or could 
not afford to do so because of the social pressure from their family. 
Intervention B: Another possible intervention lies in direct measures intended to 
increase the status of women. These could be legal measures to secure certain rights or 
programs that, for instance, make it easier for women to find a job outside the home. But 
with low education of the woman and with a large number of children to look after, there 
is little chance that the woman can actually benefit from such measures. 
Intervention C: Female education, finally, turns out to be the key variable for the 
reversal of the mechanism because it can reach women before they start to have children. 
If women have the chance to learn reading and writing a t  young ages and even receive 
aome secondary education, then this will significantly increase their probability of having 
aome employment before marrying, and this will consequently delay their first birth. It is 
also likely to increase the woman's status in society and her power to deliberately choose 
her desired family size. 
In summary, in the above described positive feedback loop education of women 
might be the key factor to turn the vicious cycle into a beneficial one, but the other two 
factors, namely availability of contraceptive methods and some policies to enhance the 
woman's status in a legal and economic way, are also necessary to make the beneficial cir- 
cle work. In this case the systems approach indicates that a single action, especially when 
it is trying to influence fertility directly, does not work. Only if several strategies are fol- 
lowed simultaneously with a right dose of emphasis on the various necessary interven- 
tions, may the desired outcome be achieved. 
POPULATION A N D  FOOD 
G. K. Heilig 
1. The traditional concept 
Throughout the 1950s and moat of the 1960s i t  was generally believed that the 
number of people in Asia, Africa and Latin America would simply outgrow the carrying 
capacity of their soils to  supply enough food. It was argued that excessive population 
growth slows down agricultural development, while a t  the same time it increases food 
demand. Gloomy projections were made that the growing food deficit in the Third World 
would result in widespread starvation, which - through the feedback effect of increased 
mortality - would slow down population growth in the end. This argument is visualized 
below. It rests on the classical, monecausal explanation of hunger first introduced by the 
(early) Malthus. 
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2 .  The eztended model 
By the end of the 19709, however, this point of view was under challenge. It could be 
shown that in many parts of the Third World the level of food production had kept up 
with population growth. Actually average food production per capita in the 1970s was 
well above the level of the 1940s and 1950s - despite the fact that the population has near- 
ly doubled since then. Nevertheless, millions were still hungry. This was the time when it  
was realized that widespread malnutrition is not necessarily the result of a shortage of 
food supply. If people do not have the resources t o  acquire food they will starve even in 
the face of well stocked markets. Hence the conventional model of a monecausal relation 
between population growth and hunger had to  be extended by a third factor. Now it was 
necessary to distinguish explicitly between the supply of food and the ability of individu- 
als to acquire food. It was discussed why certain groups of the population failed to  gain 
access to  food, but most scientists accepted poverty as the key factor of the food problem 
and economic development as part of its solution. The basic logic behind this argument is 
shown graphically below. 
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3. The concept of agricultural modernization 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s development in many developing countries 
(especially in Asia) accelerated. They improved their rural infrastructure (streets, irriga- 
tion systems), increased the supply of modern agricultural inputs (such as fertilizers and 
seeds of high yield varieties), intensified agricultural research, introduced free market- 
prices for agricultural products and thus encouraged farmers to  increase production. 
Several record harvests in India, Thailand and China during the 1980s seemed to  prove 
that economic development and agricultural modernization could break the vicious circle 
of population growth, poverty and hunger. After centuries of recurring famines India, for 
instance, could declare self sufficiency of food. 
The basic idea behind the concentration on rural areas was that poverty and popula- 
tion growth are the result of a stagnation in the development of the rural economy and 
society. Agricultural modernization was intended to  trigger rural development and attack 
the problem of hunger from three sides: first, to  provide better economic chances for the 
rural population to  fight poverty, aecond to  encourage family planning in order t o  lower 
population growth, and third to increase food production. 
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4. Beyond the concept of rural development and agricultural modernization - a systems 
approach 
Despite the great success of the "Green Revolution" and high rates of economic 
growth in certain parts of Asia there is no way to overlook the fact that millions still 
suffer from malnutrition and poverty. In fact Africa south of the Sahara even experienced 
a rapid decline of per capita food production during the 1980s. It has become obvious that 
very often African subsistence farmers and cattle breeders are unable to feed their own 
families - to say nothing of their urban relatives. This shows that agricultural moderniza- 
tion as a means to eradicate hunger is only possible under certain conditions. 
The "Green Revolution" was only successful in those (Asian) areas, where it was 
implemented by competent planners and executed by experienced farmers with a long 
tradition in agriculture. It also required sufficient rainfall or highly sophisticated irriga- 
tion systems, such as can be found in the Pundjabarea in Northern India, in Bali or in 
Thailand. In order to use expensive high-yield seeds, artificial fertilizers and more efficient 
tools it was necessary that some investment capital was provided for the farmers. Thew 
conditions, however, are not given in most parts of Africa south of the Sahara. Droughts 
regularly strike large areas, not seldom for several years in succemion. Many soils are not 
suited for irrigation because minerals (such as salt) are washed out. The high-yield seeds 
of rice, wheat and corn which doubled the harvests of some Asian countries are not 
adapted to  the dry African climate. On top of this a large number of civil wars and 
conflicts with neighboring states devastated many agricultural areas, absorbed labor and 
drove the rural population from their traditional lands - ae in Mozambique, Angola, 
Ethiopia or Somalia. 'Hunger' has become a political weapon in Africa: sometimes 
governments have stopped foreign food-aid to certain areas controlled by rebels. The agri- 
cultural disaster in most parts of Africa south of the Sahara during the 1980s and its his- 
torical record of famines and food shortages during this decade finally destroyed the 
confidence in simple, straight-forward theories of how to solve the world food problem. 
Given the complexity of demographic, economic, aociecultural and political factors of 
hunger in Africa, it would be rather naive to analyze demographic aspects of food-deficits 
in isolation. Only a systems approach is capable of improving our understanding of the 
world food problem and to guide political action. 
Today we know that neither population growth nor drought nor poverty or any 
other single factor as such is the cause of hunger. It is the network of interactive effects 
between human, social and environmental components which determines the emergence of 
hunger. To  study the causes of malnutrition from a systems analysis point of view it 
would be necessary to take into account a t  least the following aspects: 
Population density: if population density is very low, even a high rate of population 
growth might initially be harmless. 
Urbanization: if a large proportion of the population lives in cities the demand for 
imported food is especially high. 
Food imports and food aid: the food supply of a country comes from two sources: 
domestic food production and imports. High food imports might result in a shortage 
of foreign exchange. Today many experts are convinced that permanent food aid is 
one of the causes of hunger in developing countries: i t  ruins the food prices on local 
markets and discourages domestic farmers. 
Economic policy: the level of agricultural modernization depends heavily on the 
overall economic framework of the country (free market/centrally planned econ- 
omy). 
Resources: food security is also a function of the availability of certain natural and 
economic resources (soils, water, fertilizers; investment capital, banking system). 
Human capital: probably the most important factor for rural development is human 
creativity and initiative. T o  increase the level of education and technical skills in a 
rural population might be more important in the long run for the eradication of 
hunger than the organization of international food-aid or the implementation of a 
radical family planning program. 
Technology: a scientific analysis of food shortages has to take into account that 
modern (agricultural) technology has opened a productivity gate which offers a 
chance to adapt agriculture to much higher levels of population growth than was the 
case in the past. Agricultural modernization alone, however, does not solve the food 
problems in the leas developed countries. It might even have negative feedback 
effects on population and food in the short run. Modernization programs tend to  
favor larger-eize f a r m  which have easier access to  investment capital and know-how 
than small-holdings. As a result of increasing productivity agricultural moderniza- 
tion aleo produces rural unemployment which fuels the migration to  the urban areas. 
Distribution of land and income: it does not make sense, for instance, to  study popu- 
lation growth in Latin America as a factor of food shortages, being blind to  the p r o b  
lem that the great majority of the rural population has no access to  the fertile soils. 
Environmental side-effects: environmental destruction might result from increased 
agricultural production, which is the inevitable consequence of population growth in 
the less developed countries. While it is certainly necessary to  avoid negative en- 
vironmental feedbacks of agricultural intensification, it would be hypocritical to  
blame only the less developed countries for this problem. When poor settlers in the 
Amazon are clearing large areas of rain forest to  grow food they are just doing the 
same thing as our grand-grandfathers did in Europe and Northern America. Environ- 
mental degradation as a result of increased food production is a global problem. 
A demographic systems approach to the problem of malnutrition has to  take into ac- 
count the links between population, society and natural environment. Below is a provi- 
sional model to  analyze some of these links. 
The model assumes that population growth directly increases the amount of food re- 
quired ("food need") due to the growing number of food consumers. To meet this addi- 
tional need for food a rural family can either increase its own production or buy food on 
the local market. Increasing production, however, is only possible if the family has access 
to additional soils or modern inputs to increase productivity. The ability to buy food 
depends on the family's income available for food, and a free market which reacts to in- 
creasing demand. Hence, the pattern of adapting food supply to population growth is 
linked to the environmental, social and economic situation of a country. The level of (rur- 
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al) unemployment, for instance, determines the amount of income available to rural fami- 
lies to buy food. On the other hand: a possible increase of subsistence production depends 
on the availability of additional soils for the rural population. The potential agricultural 
area, however, might be restricted by ecological conditions or legal regulations. 
In countries with a market economy the supply-side of the food system is fueled from 
two sources: domestic market production and (net)imports of food. The increase of 
domestic market production is essentially a matter of agricultural modernization, govern- 
mental support for infrastructure and investment, and the availability of fertile soils. 
Agricultural modernization, in turn, heavily depends on the level of education and techni- 
cal skills among the rural population. High rates of population growth, however, tend to 
increase the strain on the educational system and thus tend to hinder progress in educa- 
tion and training. The amount of food imports in a country often correlates with its level 
of urbanization. Since rural population growth tends to increase rural-urban migration it 
indirectly increases the demand for food imports. 
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